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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Hubbard appeals, asserting that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, or alternatively, by not ruling on his 
motion for the district judge to recuse herself. Specifically, he claimed that the 
district court violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it 
imposed his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender because it based his 
sentence on the facts of the underlying lewd and lascivious charge that had been 
resolved in California, rather than basing the sentence on the facts of the charge filed in 
Idaho. 
In summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition for post-conviction relief, the 
district court relied on its own recollection of the considerations behind its statements at 
the sentencing hearing. This was error because those facts were not necessary to 
resolve the double jeopardy issue. Alternatively, it was erroneous for the presiding 
district court judge to essentially testify to those facts. Relying on those facts also 
highlights the conflict of the judge's interests at issue in this case. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the order summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition, or, alternatively, 
it should vacate the order summarily dismissing the petition and remand the case for 
new proceedings before a different judge. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hubbard entered a guilty plea to the charge of failure to register. 
State v. Hubbard, 2013 WL 5982874, 1 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied (unpublished 
opinion from the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction). He appealed from the 
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judgment of conviction, asserting that the district court had violated his constitutional 
right to free from double jeopardy when it imposed his Id. The rt of 
Appeals determined that the issue had not been preserved below and was not 
reviewable as fundamental error. Id. However, it noted that Mr. Hubbard could still 
raise the issue before the district court following remand of the case. Id. 
Thereafter, Mr. Hubbard filed a timely petition for post conviction relief, 
contending, inter a/ia, that the district court had violated his constitutional right to be free 
from double jeopardy when it imposed his sentence. (See, e.g., R., pp.5, 7.) 
Specifically, he claimed that the district court had subjected him to multiple punishments 
for the same conduct, evidenced by its assertions that: 
it felt California had been too lenient when it sentenced Mr. Hubbard [and] 
did not trust California to keep Mr. Hubbard in prison (which the Idaho 
district court believed was necessary, but which the California superior 
court, in its discretion, had suspended), and so the Idaho district court 
decided to go above and beyond the recommendation of the State and 
impose a significant prison sentence in the California superior court's 
stead. 
(R., p.13; see also R., pp.43-46 (counsel bolstering that claim, quoting extensively from 
the transcript of the sentencing hearing).) Mr. Hubbard also requested that the district 
court judge recuse herself from this case because those comments indicated bias or 
prejudice against him. (R., pp.6-7.) The district court judge did not rule on the motion 
for disqualification, but she did continue to preside over the case. ( See generally R.) 
Mr. Hubbard's attorney also moved the district court to consolidate the post 
conviction proceedings with the criminal case, so that the district court could provide 
relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a) in the criminal case based on the same double jeopardy 
violation. (See R., p.41.) Defense counsel asserted that part of the reason for the 
2 
motion was to ensure that the underlying criminal record was before the district court in 
the conviction proceedings.' (Post Conviction Tr., p.6, Ls.6-7.) The objected 
to motion to consolidate, and also asserted that Mr. Hubbard's claim on double 
jeopardy was fully litigated during the direct appeal, and so, should be barred by res 
judicata. (R., pp.77-79, 81.) Both parties requested summary disposition in their favor. 
(R., pp.48-49, 96.) 
At a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the district court decided that 
res judicata did not bar Mr. Hubbard's double jeopardy claim because the issue was not 
addressed on its merits in the direct appeal. (Post Conviction Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, 
) The district court also pointed out that Mr. Hubbard had the option to pursue his 
double jeopardy claim in either through an I.C.R. 35 motion or through conviction 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901, and that he had opted to use the post conviction petition. 
(Post Conviction Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.2; Post Conviction Tr., p.13, Ls.1-17.) As a 
result, it denied the motion to consolidate. (Post Conviction Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5.) The 
1 Mr. Hubbard also moved the district court to "take judicial notice of its own record in 
[CR} FE 2011 9346 . . . including, without limitation, the information, judgment, 
presentence report, sealed order correcting the presentence report, and the transcript of 
the entry of plea (August 24, 2011) and sentencing (October 12, 2011 )." (R., pp.101-
02.) The district court took judicial notice of "the Court's guilty plea form, the guilty plea 
and sentencing transcript, and the portions of the presentence investigation report ... 
identified by [Mr.] Hubbard." (R., pp.116-17.) A motion for this Court to take judicial 
notice of these same documents has been filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
As it appears as though the entire PSI was included in the order taking judicial 
notice, citations to the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) will 
correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file "HUBBARD PSI," which 
was provided in Docket Number 39449. Additionally, citations to the transcripts which 
were judicially noticed from the underlying criminal case file (which are contained in a 
single volume) will be identified as "Criminal Tr." Citations to the transcript of the 
summary dismissal hearing prepared in this case will be identified as "Post Conviction 
Tr." Since the district court apparently did not take judicial notice of the record 
underlying criminal case, only the Post Conviction record is cited in this brief. 
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district cou1i also decided that it did not need any more evidence to resolve double 
Conviction Tr., p.1 Ls.2-5.) 
The district court decided to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal. 
(R., p.'117.) In reaching that conclusion, the district court offered its recollection of its 
intent and considerations behind its statements at the sentencing hearing which 
Mr. Hubbard was challenging as violating his constitutional rights: 
In Hubbard's case, the Court properly considered the California case and 
Hubbard's entire criminal history, in order to determine whether Hubbard 
was a danger to society. Counsel for Hubbard argued that California 
should take responsibility for Hubbard, as it would save the Idaho 
taxpayer's money and the underlying charge occurred in California. The 
Court addressed this argument by observing California had continually 
released Hubbard Hubbard had continually violated first his probation 
and then his Based on that history, the Court did not 
California would properly protect society and the public from Hubbard. 
(R., p.123.) As a result of that assertion, the district court concluded that Mr. Hubbard's 
claim for post conviction relief on the basis of double jeopardy could be summarily 
dismissed. (R., p.124.) 
Mr. Hubbard filed a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment dismissing his 
petition for post conviction relief. (R., pp.131-35.) 
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1. Whether the district court 
for post conviction relief 
at the sentencing hearing. 
ISSUES 
by summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition 
on its inappropriate explanation of its statements 
Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. Hubbard's motion for the 
district court judge to recuse herself from this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Summarily DismissingMr. Hubbard's Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief Based On Its Inappropriate Explanation Of Its Statements At The 
Sentencing Hearing 
A. As The Question Of Whether The Record Demonstrates A Double Jeopardy 
Violation Is A Question Of Law, Additional Fact Finding Was Not Necessary 
In this case, Mr. Hubbard presented facts which he alleged demonstrated a 
violation of his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. The question of 
whether there has been a double jeopardy violation is a question of law. State v. Bush, 
131 Idaho 22, 33 (1997); State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 530-3·1 (Ct. App. 2013), review 
denied. Thus, when a challenge has been made that the record demonstrates a double 
jeopardy violation, no additional fact finding is necessary; rather, the court considering 
that claim need simply review the record to determine whether there has, as a matter of 
law, been a violation. See id. The district court recognized as much. (Post Conviction 
Tr., p.16, Ls.2-5 (deciding that it did not need additional evidence to resolve the double 
jeopardy question).) Therefore, it was unnecessary and irrelevant for the district court 
to rely on additional facts from its memory of its intent and considerations at the 
sentencing hearing. 
Additionally, questions of law are reviewed de nova. See, e.g., Karle v. Visser, 
141 Idaho 804, 806 (2005). Therefore, this case does not need to be remanded since 
this Court can review the evidence properly in the record and determine whether there 
was a double jeopardy violation. The evidence properly in the record in this case 
demonstrates that there was a violation of Mr. Hubbard's constitutional rights. 
6 
Therefore, this Court should reverse 
Hubbard. 
of summary judgment and order relief for 
To be entitled to relief in post conviction, a petitioner must prove his claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 27 (2000). Mr. Hubbard 
has met that burden in regard to his double jeopardy claim. The United States 
Constitution provides: "No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The federal protection against 
double jeopardy has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U . 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other 
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U . 802-03 (1989). The Idaho Constitution 
provides the same protection as the federal constitution. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 13. 
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with its federal counterpart. 
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
These protections can be violated in three ways: (1) engaging in a second 
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered; (2) engaging in a 
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been entered; and 
(3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. The district court's violation in 
this case is an example of the third form of violation. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized that, even if the punishments imposed are authorized by the Legislature, 
7 
imposing additional punishments in a second proceeding violates the dou jeopardy 
protections. State v. Avelar, 1 Idaho 778 ('1999). 2 
Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for the underlying charges by the appropriate 
court in California, where all the relevant acts took place. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.131-32 
(the Judgment of Conviction entered by the California superior court).) The California 
superior court imposed a six-year sentence, which it suspended for a five-year period of 
probation. (PSI, pp.131-137.) It also ordered Mr. Hubbard to serve 364 days in custody 
before being released on probation. (PSI, p.131.) When Mr. Hubbard was found to be 
in violation of his probation in 2005, the California court revoked Mr. Hubbard's 
probation and executed the underlying six-year sentence. (PSI, p.156.) Mr. Hubbard 
was subsequently released on parole. (See, e.g., PSI, p.143.) 
Nevertheless, the Idaho district court, displeased with the California superior 
court's sentencing decisions, determined that "I don't feel comfortable trusting California 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court cited to United States v. Halper to support this conclusion. 
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper held that the State may not seek a civil penalty that is for 
retributive, as opposed to remedial, purposes in a proceeding separate from the 
proceeding in which the criminal penalty was imposed because doing so constitutes a 
second punishment and so violates the protections against double jeopardy. Halper, 
490 U.S. at 448-49. Halper, however, has been subsequently abrogated because it 
deviated from traditional double jeopardy analyses. Hudson v. United States, 522 
U.S. 93, 99, 101 (1997). It failed to make the threshold determination of whether the 
civil penalties were so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties, thus 
bringing them within the realm of the double jeopardy protections, and it also failed to 
assess the statute under which the sanctions were imposed, as opposed to the 
character of the sanctions themselves. Id. The Hudson abrogation, however, only 
attacks the Halper Court's consideration of the penalties themselves, not the conclusion 
that imposing them at a second proceeding would violate the double jeopardy 
protections. See id. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Avelar survives 
Hudson, so long as the additional penalties are appropriately within the scope of the 
double jeopardy protections. Imposing more extensive prison sentences are definitely 
within the scope of those protections. 
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to not allow you out " (Criminal Tr., Ls.4-6.) Idaho court 
I'm not going to go through all of the--everything that's in this presentence 
report. But it is really clear that the prosecutor has nailed it.[3] You blame 
the victim in this case, and according to her statements, that abuse started 
when she was six years old. And there was a second person who came 
and made allegations, whether he was convicted or not. And I've also 
found that people can pass polygraphs all over the place.[4] 
(Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.15-24 (emphasis added to provide one of many examples of the 
district court's focus on the facts of the underlying California crime, rather than the 
charge pending before it).) The Idaho district court's statements reveal that it felt that its 
cou from California had somehow abused its discretion (although there has 
been no showing that it had done so) and been too lenient in its dealings with 
Mr. Hubbard. (See, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.32, L.6.) As a result, the district 
court imposed the sentence it did to punish Mr. Hubbard for those underlying offenses: 
"I recognize what I'm going to do is going to cost the taxpayers here, but I suspect that 
the taxpayer would just as soon pay the cost to make sure that you're locked up and not 
3 The prosecutor comments in this regard focused on a letter Mr. Hubbard wrote to the 
mother of the victim in the California case in which he discussed his views of the 
California offense at that time. (See Tr., No. 39449, p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.13.) The letter 
is included in the PSI immediately following the police reports and immediately 
preceding the judgment of conviction in the underlying California case, indicating that it 
was written at the time the underlying case was proceeding in California some ten years 
ago. (See PSI, pp.124-32.) 
4 This statement indicates that the Idaho district court felt that Mr. Hubbard had 
hoodwinked its counterpart from California, earning a more lenient sentence because 
he had been deliberately deceptive on a polygraph. (See Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. Hubbard had taken and passed that polygraph in regard to accusations from a 
second potential victim (i.e., answered truthfully, denying those allegations). (See 
Criminal Tr., p.31, Ls.13-22.) According to Mr. Hubbard, there was not a second 
conviction at that time, but rather, there was just a revocation of his probation. (Criminal 
Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.) 
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trust do what it's supposed to do." (Criminal Tr., p.30, 
Furthermore, the district court berated Mr. Hubbard, saying: 
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the 
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of 
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to 
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this 
case. 
(Criminal Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) Most 
interestingly, the district court refers to "the victim in this case." (Criminal Tr., p.33, 
Ls.18-19.) "This case" is a failure to register case. (See R., p.67.) The only victim in a 
failure to case is the state; there is no specific victim. ( See, PSI, p.2.) 
There is certainly not a victim who Mr. Hubbard can blame. In fact, he did not blame 
Idaho for his failure to register: "I was absconding, so I wasn't even looking up the laws 
or anything. I was trying to get (a friend] up here to the VA hospital and get gone, get 
back to California. So I didn't even bother looking it up. [I] was being a big dummy." 
(Criminal Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) He accepted responsibility for his actions and did 
not blame the State of Idaho for his failure. (See Criminal Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) 
As such, the only victim to whom the Idaho district court could possibly be 
referring is the victim in the underlying California case. The fact that it refers to her as 
the victim "in this case" is critical and clearly demonstrates the error. (Criminal Tr., p.33, 
Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) "This case" is not the California case, yet the district court 
behaved as if it were. Therefore, the sentence it imposed was premised on the facts of 
the California case, not the failure to register charge, and thus, clearly violated 
Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
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It is also evident that the facts by the district court were not relevant 
to failure to register. , p.67 (noting Mr. Hubbard was only 
charged in Idaho of failing to register).) The applicable statutes only require the State to 
prove that Mr. Hubbard was subject to the relevant code sections and that he failed to 
provide certain information to the State within the requisite time frame. See I.C. § 18-
8307. It does not require an investigation or disclosure of the underlying offense. 
See id. The inquiry is separate and distinct from the underlying prosecution.5 See id.; 
I.C. § 18-8311. The punishment for failing to register is also separate from the sentence 
for the underlying offense. See I .C. § 18-8311 (particularly noting the fact that if the 
defendant was on probation (i.e., already separately punished)6 when he failed to 
register, the district court's discretion to order probation or retain jurisdiction is 
removed). 
And while consideration of the defendant's criminal record may be permissible at 
sentencing, the district court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the judgment 
of another court. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(recognizing that the sentencing court has broad discretion, which will not be interfered 
with absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion). It is impermissible to remedy 
any dissatisfaction with the severity of a sentence imposed by another court by 
5 This is particularly true in this case, since the Idaho district court would have no 
jurisdiction over the acts committed in Trinity County, California. 
6 Mr. Hubbard recognizes that the statute does not clarify whether the probation is for 
the underlying offense or some other offense, but would assert that, as this section is 
predicated on a prior offense, the period of probation may be reasonably construed to 
include probation for the underlying offense. See I.C. § 18-8311. As such, the statute 
itself does recognize that this is a separate and distinct punishment from that for the 
underlying crime. See id. 
11 
punishing the defendant again for same offenses. v. Findeisen, 1 Idaho 
230 (Ct App. 1999). Nevertheless, based on its comments, that is what 
the district court did to Mr. Hubbard. (See, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; 
p.32, Ls.2-6.) 
By sentencing Mr. Hubbard based on the conduct in the underlying California 
case, rather than for the Idaho failure to register, the district court violated 
Mr. Hubbard's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the order summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition and order 
appropriate relief in his favor. 
B. If Additional Facts And Explanations Are Necessary To The Summary Judgment 
Decision, Mr. Hubbard Was Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing, And The 
Presiding Judge Could Not Be The Source Of That Additional Evidence At The 
Subsequent Hearing 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief is only appropriate 
when the petitioner does not allege facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to relief. Baldwin v. State, 
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007). To that end, "[a] court is required to accept the petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions." Id. 
Additionally, "summary judgment is improper when a conflict in affidavits respecting 
issues of fact exists, or when the relevant pleadings, depositions and affidavits raise any 
questions of credibility of witnesses." Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 798 
(2001) (quoting Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 918-19 (1972)); see also 
Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817, 818-18 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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In summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition, the district court judge offered 
following explanation of the intent and considerations underlying 
decisions: 
sentencing 
In Hubbard's case, the Court properly considered the California case and 
Hubbard's entire criminal history, in order to determine whether Hubbard 
was a danger for society. Counsel for Hubbard argued that California 
should take responsibility for Hubbard, as it would save the Idaho 
taxpayer's money and the underlying charge occurred in California. The 
Court addressed this argument by observing California had continually 
released Hubbard and Hubbard had continually violated first his probation 
and then his parole. Based on that history, the Court did not believe 
California would properly protect society and the public from Hubbard. 
(R., p.123.) Even if the district court's assertion about its thoughts and considerations at 
the sentencing hearing might properly be considered in the post conviction context, that 
explanation only creates a genuine issue of material fact in regard to whether the district 
court was sentencing Mr. Hubbard based on the California case. See Wait, 136 Idaho 
at 798. As such, even if the district court's assertion is considered, the order summarily 
dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief should still be vacated and 
the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
Furthermore, the district court's assertion does not actually contradict most of 
Mr. Hubbard's allegations. For example, the assertion does not offer any clarification as 
to how, by imposing a sentence because "you [Mr. Hubbard] blame the victim in this 
case," (see, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19), the district court was imposing a 
sentence for anything but the underlying California case. As a result, even if the district 
court's assertion was properly considered, it still erred by summarily dismissing 
Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief, since Mr. Hubbard's unrebutted 
allegations, if true, would entitle him to relief. 
13 
the district court's assertion about its thoughts and considerations is 
not properly considered as evidence against Mr. Hubbard's allegations because that 
assertion does not constitute competent evidence upon which the district court could 
properly rely. Cf. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82 (2002) (holding that a district 
court's conclusion will be deemed clearly erroneous if it was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence). That is because "[t]he judge presiding at the trial 
may not testify as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point." 
1.R.E. 605. The district court judge's explanation of her statements is the functional 
equivalent of testimony designed to establish facts not otherwise in the record based on 
the district court judge's own memory of the event in question namely the district 
court's intention and mindset when it imposed the sentence in this case. 
The conclusion that the presiding judge is not a competent witness in the 
pending case is consistent with the rule that the district court judge may not take judicial 
notice of her own memory. "Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are 
within the personal recollected knowledge of the judge, if those facts are not also 
generally known in the jurisdiction." Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-08 (1992). 
This is because such facts "are not capable of accurate and ready determination." Id. at 
808; see also I.RE. 201 (to be properly subject to judicial notice, the facts must be 
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned"). Therefore, as the Idaho Supreme Court has 
already held, summary dismissal of a post conviction petition based only on facts 
remembered by the district court judge constitutes error. Matthews, 122 Idaho at 
807-08. 
14 
in 
Mr. Hu 
district court 
post conviction petition only on 
its decision to summarily dism 
the court remembered about 
its intent and considerations at the sentencing hearing. (See R., pp.123-24.) Those 
facts were not generally known in the jurisdiction of the district court in this case. No 
other person could have known what was in the judge's mind as she imposed 
Mr. Hubbard's sentence, and she could not testify as to those facts while presiding over 
the case. Furthermore, those facts were not capable of an accurate and ready 
authentication, "since judges, like witnesses in criminal trials, lack infallible memories 
and perfect records of their motivations." Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 57 (1973). 
Therefore, those facts were beyond the jurisdiction of the district court to consider in 
resolving the post conviction claim a double jeopardy violation. 
The district court erred by relying on its own account of what it was considering 
and why. As a result, if such additional evidence needs to be considered to resolve the 
double jeopardy question, this Court should vacate order summarily dismissing 
Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief and remand the case for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
11. 
The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Hubbard's Motion For The District Court 
Judge To Recuse Herself From This Case 
In his initial filing, Mr. Hubbard requested that the district court judge recuse 
herself in this case. (R., p.7.) He made that request based on the district court judge's 
"clearly apparent [bias) and evidenced prejudicial comments and beliefs made on the 
record in the district court (See [Criminal] Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.33, L.55 [sic).)" (R., p.6.) 
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Because he made the motion based on the district court judge's bias or prejud it 
constituted a motion for disqualification for cause. I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A)(4 ). The 
Rules of Civil Procedure require that the district court rule on such motions: "Upon filing 
of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall be without authority to act 
further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for disqualification." 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted that rule to mean that "all 
orders following the filing of a motion to disqualify ... but prior to a ruling on that motion, 
'were improper, void and of no effect."' Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470 (1995) 
(quoting Lewiston Lime Co. v. Barney, 87 Idaho 462,467 (1964)). 
The district court did not rule on Mr. Hubbard's motion for disqualification for 
cause. (See generally R.) As such, all the orders in the post conviction proceedings, 
including the order summarily dismissing the petition, are improper, void and of no 
effect. Therefore, this Court should vacate those orders and remand this case for 
further proceedings complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the event that this Court determines that the district court judge did implicitly 
deny that motion by continuing to preside over the case, the district court abused its 
discretion in doing so. Denial of a motion for a judge to recuse herself is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 390 (2013), 
reh 'g denied. 
The code of judicial conduct provides: 
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
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(a) the judge . . . personal of disputed evidentiary 
facts that might reasonably affect the judge's impartiality in the 
proceedings; [or] 
(d) the judge ... 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding. 
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E(1 )(a), (d)(iv). In this case, it was obvious 
from Mr. Hubbard's initial pleadings that the district court judge's personal knowledge of 
disputed facts was going to be at issue in this case, as only she could offer any 
potentially-relevant insight as to the rationales behind the challenged sentencing 
determinations. Additionally, because this particular judge's decision was being 
challenged on the basis that it violated one of the defendant's constitutional rights, the 
judge was being asked to review the propriety of her own conduct. That conflict of 
interest creates, at least, the appearance of impropriety in the subsequent post 
conviction decisions. Therefore, the district court judge abused her discretion by not 
recusing herself in this matter. 
As a result, this case should, at least, be remanded for new proceedings before a 
different judge. This should be the result regardless of whether this Court determines 
that the district court erred by not ruling on the motion for disqualification or by 
improperly denying the motion for disqualification. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hubbard respectfully that this rt reverse the order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post conviction relief and order relief be granted. 
Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his 
petition and remand this case for new proceedings before a new district court judge. 
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014. 
gR.IAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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